Emiliya Yu. Bobovnikova — 1st year post-graduate student of the Faculty of Law, St. Petersburg State University. 
Address: 7–9 Universitetskaya Emb., 199034 St. Petersburg, Russian Federation. E-mail: eyubobovnikova@ya.ru 

Kirill S. Vorobev — 4th year student of the Judicial and Prosecutorial specialty of the Institute of Prosecutor’s Office, Ural State Law University named after V.F. Yakovlev. 
Address: 21 Komsomolskaya St., 620066 Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation. E-mail: kirill.vorobev09@gmail.com 

Danil A. Zhikharev — 1st year master’s student at the Institute of Education of the Higher School of Economics. 
Address: 16-10 Potapovsky Lane, 101000 Moscow, Russian Federation. Email: dazhikharev@edu.hse.ru (сorresponding author) 

Ruslan K. Kuchakov — Junior Researcher, Institute for the Rule of Law, European University at Saint Petersburg. 
Address: 6/1a Gagarinskaya St., 191187 Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation. E-mail: rkuchakov@eu.spb.ru 

Gennadii A. Porosenkov — Expert of Laboratory for Anti-Corruption Policy, National Research University Higher School of Economics. 
Address: 20 Myasnitskaya St., 101000 Moscow, Russian Federation. E-mail: gporosenkov@hse.ru 

The study examines the targeting of scheduled and surprise inspections of school food services conducted by Rospotrebnadzor. Using reports of cases of mass poisoning from open sources and official inspection data, we look at the association between inspections and mass poisoning incidents in Russian schools. We find that schools are the most audited organizations among all areas of economic activity. Schools bear a significant part of the regulatory burden, contrary to the popular belief that the business actors are the most audited. However, we do not find any changes in the organization of inspections after food poisoning incidents. We also outline the limitations of the risk-based approach in educational institutions.